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Thoughts on Building an
Academic  Career
George  W.  Ladd
We have many routes to success in agricultural  economics: extension  education, resident
teaching,  advising,  research,  public service. In selecting problems to study we must be
sensitive to needs of all  our clientele.  Several  production economics concepts are
relevant to allocating our own efforts.  Noticing,  recognizing,  and experiencing surprise
aid scientific discovery.  We need to use heuristics,  intuition,  deduction,  and induction,
though consideration  of science's ideal and real types  shows that all these mental
processes  are fallible.  We need special  theories that have broad application.
Replication  deserves high priority. A few thoughts  on the manuscript  review process
are presented.
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Nobel Prize winner Peter Medawar urged that
scientists  study  (pp.  126-27) "the behavioral
and intellectual structure of  everything that goes
into  the  enlargement  of our  knowledge  and
understanding of nature."  Such a study should
be congenial  to economists'  interests because
it  recognizes  that  developing  a  science  and
building a  successful  scientific  career  require
scientists to allocate their own resources effec-
tively.  This  article  presents  some  ideas  ac-
quired from  the kind  of study that Medawar
urged.  They may be useful as you decide how
to manage your own  career and allocate your
own resources.  My primary thesis is that there
are topics other than economics, statistics, and
mathematics that are relevant to an economics
career.
Many Roads  to Professional  Success
After the Awards Ceremony at the 1987 sum-
mer  meetings  of the  American  Agricultural
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Economics  Association  (AAEA),  President
Havlicek  expressed  the  hope  that  members
would  read  the Fellows'  citations  to  see  the
many ways to succeed in agricultural econom-
ics. To show what he meant, I quote from the
various citations some of the reasons for grant-
ing these Fellowships:  "a distinguished career
in research, teaching, extension, and service to
industry, his universities, and the profession,"
"popular  and  effective  teacher,"  "university
statesman,"  "service  to AAEA,"  "success  in
developing practical solutions to difficult prob-
lems,"  "outstanding  extension  educator,"
"unusually imaginative  and original  research
worker,"  "contributions  to  regional  research
activities,"  "served in a wide variety of coun-
seling,  committee,  and  extension  roles,"
"teaching and  counseling  skills," "consultant
to  the  presiding  bishops  of  the  Episcopal
Church  on  world  food  issues,"  "superior
scholarship,  teaching,  and  service."  You see,
our  profession  does  honor  accomplishments
in many different professional activities; it does
provide many routes to success.
Economic  Principles for Managing an
Economics  Career
We can use economic principles in managing
our own efforts.
Pay attention to your  own utility function.
Spend a significant part of your time on work
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you like to do.  You will enjoy life more and
you will also be more productive.
You can  have a portfolio  of research  pro-
jects: some safe projects with sure payoffs and
some  risky  ones with  smaller  probability  of
success but with some possibility of dramatic
results. The mix depends upon your risk aver-
sion or risk affection.  Working on several pro-
jects also provides an escape hatch when you
become bored  or frustrated with one. Having
a portfolio  of teaching and research responsi-
bilities also is beneficial.
A researcher  must  use  a  limitational  pro-
duction  input:  scientific  daring,  a willingness
to take a chance  on something new. It is lim-
itational because your  productivity is  zero  if
you lack it. Along  with this  must also  go an
ability to handle feelings of vulnerability:  the
feeling  that you are an unprotected  target  for
everyone  who  has  never tried  what  you  are
trying to do. In universities  it is easier to dare
if you have the support of your dean, director,
and department head.
A key idea in production theory is marginal
productivity. In choosing the research that you
will do,  compare your knowledge,  skills,  and
interests with those of other economists, and
consider where are the greater unmet needs for
information. In this way you identify the pro-
jects on which your anticipated marginal  pro-
ductivity  and  comparative  advantage  are
greatest.
Find and use your comparative  advantages.
A comparative  advantage arises from a differ-
ence.  If you  pattern yourself too  closely after
others,  you  have  no  comparative  advantage
over them. Some  sources of comparative ad-
vantage  are  training,  job experience,  and  in-
tellect.  Comparative advantage may also arise
from  your  personality,  the  kind  of person-
not the kind of economist-that you are. I can
best show this by using myself as an example.'
In reminiscing  on his research  in scientific
discovery,  Simon  (1989) emphasized  the im-
portance of the phenomenon of surprise in dis-
covering  new problems  or new solutions;  no-
ticing  something  surprising  is  often  the  first
step in discovery. A capacity for surprise is an
important (perhaps a necessary) aid to discov-
'Note  our profession's  penchant  for happy  names:  "greatest
comparative advantage"  in preference to "least relative disadvan-
tage,"  "negative  economic  growth"  in preference to "decline"  or
"recession."  Why  do we not use "negative  recession"  instead of
"prosperity"?
ery.  Simon  also  wrote that noticing  and  rec-
ognizing are mental  activities that contribute
to scientific  discovery:  to recognize  the same
idea or pattern under different names, to notice
unsuspected  interrelationships  or  identities.
Surprise,  recognition, and noticing are a unit.
You cannot experience surprise unless you rec-
ognize that something  is surprising.  And you
cannot recognize until you notice. The ability
to notice, recognize, and experience surprise is
a valuable asset.
I enjoy  synthesis more  than  analysis,  and
my mind seems naturally to try to synthesize
things without any conscious commands from
me. I enjoy putting together ideas from differ-
ent sources, integrating firm theory and animal
breeding, using my knowledge of factor anal-
ysis to develop a model of prices and demands
for product  characteristics.  I  enjoy  studying
psychology. If  I had lacked the interest in psy-
chology, the enjoyment of synthesis, or the cu-
riosity about behavior of economists, I would
not have  studied  intuition,  imagination,  the
creative  mental  processes.  The  enjoyment  of
synthesis and the resulting reading on a variety
of subjects  have  helped  me to notice and to
recognize.
I have long believed that  I am "a good no-
ticer." My work on imagination  (Ladd  1979,
1987) started by my noticing that economists
rely on unconscious mental processes but nev-
er publicly admit doing so. And my  study of
intuition has been facilitated  by noticing  and
synthesizing.
I am not a farm boy, and I have no formal
training in agricultural economics. Because my
training was different,  I sometimes  see things
differently  than others  see them.  Sometimes
the different perception is helpful to me. Some-
times not.
Economists  who have strong  faith in their
theories have little capacity for surprise. When
they don't  see what  the theory  tells them to
see, they are disappointed that the data do not
conform  to  their  theory.  They assure  them-
selves that something must be wrong with the
data,  or the statistical  procedure,  or ...  But
they never recognize the surprising possibility
that the  theory is  really false or inapplicable
or that there  are phenomena  that the theory
says nothing about.
I am a skeptic and am convinced that "Any-
thing that everyone knows is almost certainly
wrong."  My skepticism  is even better than a
capacity for surprise. To be surprised  implies
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that one has noticed  the unexpected  and has
recognized its possible implication. Studies of
perception  have  shown  the  difficulty  of rec-
ognizing the unexpected. My skepticism makes
it unnecessary  for me  to accomplish the dif-
ficult job of recognizing the unexpected.  I ex-
pect the unexpected,  but I also expect the ex-
pected. I am not surprised to find evidence that
contradicts  a  theory  that  many  accept.  But
people have good  reasons  for accepting their
theories, and  so I am not surprised when ob-
servations are consistent with theory.  Believ-
ers can easily find confirmation of a theory but
have trouble recognizing  contradiction of the
theory. Nonbelievers can find contradiction but
have trouble  recognizing confirmation.  For a
skeptic,  recognition  of confirmation  and rec-
ognition of contradiction come equally easily.
One who  is not a skeptic can  be prepared to
recognize both confirmation and contradiction
by knowing contradictory theories without be-
ing wedded to any one theory.  I will return to
this need to know more than one theory.
Herbert Simon identifies what I think is the
best comparative advantage of  all. In his Nobel
Prize acceptance  lecture,  Simon (1979) stated:
It is a vulgar fallacy to  suppose that  scientific  inquiry
cannot be fundamental if it threatens to become useful,
or if it arises  in  response  to  problems  posed  by  the
everyday  world. The real world, in fact,  is perhaps  the
most  fertile  of all  sources  of good  research questions
calling for basic scientific  inquiry.  (p. 494)
A person who recognizes the "good research
questions" that arise in the real world and states
them in tractable  formulations without  sacri-
ficing their critical elements  exercises the best
comparative advantage  of all.
I value this trait so highly because  its pos-
sessor makes fundamental contributions to ba-
sic knowledge while also providing "useful and
practical information," which is a legislatively
mandated  responsibility  of Agricultural  Ex-
periment Stations (AES). Section  1 of the Act
of 1887  Establishing Agricultural Experiment
Stations (Hatch Act) states the Act's purpose
to  be "... to  aid in  acquiring  and  diffusing
among the people of the United  States useful
and  practical  information  on  subjects  con-
nected  with agriculture...."  Section 4  states
"... one copy [of bulletins or reports]  shall be
sent  ...  to such individuals  actually engaged
in farming as may request the same...." The
Agricultural  Marketing  Act  of 1946  imposes
similar  responsibilities  upon those  of us en-
gaged in marketing research.
Usually, we must formulate these new real-
world problems (Ladd  1987,  pp. 59-70),  i.e.,
we  must  convert  ill-structured  problems
(Simon  1973)  into well-structured  problems.
Whenever you attack a novel real-world prob-
lem, you are likely to need to introduce  some
novel  abstractions  (to be  called  novel  "ideal
types"  later in this article).  One reason  that it
is a novel task is that the appropriate  concep-
tual abstractions have not yet been construct-
ed.
Notice that we in AES are charged with pro-
viding "useful  and  practical  information"  to
"the people of the United  States."  Hence  we
must reach other audiences in addition to our
fellow professionals.  And  it is  our responsi-
bility  to take  the  initiative in reaching  these
audiences.
You  can  work  on  practical  problems  and
have  refereed  publications.  Two  of my  col-
leagues, C. Phillip Baumel and Marvin Hayen-
ga, regularly  publish  refereed journal  articles
that report results of  applied research.2 A num-
ber of my  refereed  publications  report work
that I did in response to felt practical needs of
people in agribusiness.
Intuition, Deduction,  and Induction
Three kinds of mental  operations that we use
are  intuition,  deduction,  and  induction.  (For
convenience  I use "intuition"  and  "imagina-
tion"  interchangeably  to  mean  "intuition,
imagination,  hunch, and unconscious  mental
processes  in general.")  You  frequently  must
rely on intuitive judgments, so you should de-
velop proficiency and enjoyment in exercising
your own intuition. I know, we must not trust
intuition  too  far  because  it  is  fallible  and  it
does not prove anything about the real world.
I also know that deduction (including mathe-
matics)  and  induction  (including  economet-
rics)  are  fallible  and  do  not  prove  anything
about the real world.
2  Their vitae support this contention.  Each has authored or co-
authored numerous  refereed publications  as well as extension re-
ports,  papers  in trade journals, and  reports to producer  associa-
tions.  As specific  examples,  Hayenga  has published  in refereed
journals and in extension reports and trade publications  on price-
risk management, and Baumel has published refereed papers  and
extension reports and trade journal  articles on restructuring rural
road systems.  Cooperative extension service publications, articles
in trade journals, and written reports to producer associations (such
as the  National  Pork  Producers  Council)  can  reasonably  be as-
sumed to present "useful and practical information'? on real-world
problems.
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Deduction (Including Mathematics)
Is Fallible
Science  deals  with  two  completely  different
kinds of entities and  creates  connections  be-
tween them. Machlup (chapters 5-9) contrast-
ed "ideal  types" or "theoretical  or pure  con-
structs"  with  "real  types"  or  "operational
concepts"  and  contrasted  the  clarity  of the
"ideal type" of "price"  with the ambiguity of
the "real type"  of "price  of steel."  An  ideal
type is not perfect; it is ideal because it is purely
an idea; it is hypothetical,  idealized, invented,
exact.  Real  types  are  based  on  observation,
experimentation,  statistical  procedures.  An
ideal type  is part of the mind-created  world.
A real type is part of  a mind-independent world
which  is  the  object  of our  theories.  Corre-
sponding to the two types of concepts are two
types of truth: ideal truth (ideally true) and real
or operational truth  (or true in reality).  This
distinction between ideal and real types throws
light on the debate that Levins initiated with
his paper in Choices.
To  do empirical  or applied  work  we must
find  ideal  types  that  correspond  to  the  real
types.  The  selection  of the appropriate  ideal
type depends upon the nature of the problem
under investigation  (Machlup,  pp.  244,  420-
21). In econometric work we must match econ-
omists'  ideal  types,  statisticians'  ideal types,
and the world's real types. Simon's (1989) ac-
tivities of noticing and of recognizing are keys
to successfully matching ideal types with real
types. We have no rules of  correspondence that
tell us how to do  this  matching.  I  maintain,
with Warnock,  that finding or creating  corre-
spondences between ideal and real types is done
by perception, imagination, intuition, analogy,
metaphor,  simile, and not by deductive  logic
(Ladd 1987,  pp. 90-91).
Among the ideal types of our theory of con-
sumer behavior are "prices,"  "quantities con-
sumed,"  "income."  After presenting  five  dif-
ferent definitions  of income,  Hicks  (1950,  p.
177)  wrote,  "...  income  is  a subjective con-
cept, dependent on the particular expectations
of the individual in question"  [emphasis mine].
Even  such a simple concept as "retail price
of a 16-ounce can of cut green beans that con-
tains  8.75  ounces  net weight of beans"  is an
abstraction.  I once collected  prices of canned
foods in two grocery stores in Ames. The price
of a 16-ounce can of cut green beans that con-
tained 8.75 ounces net weight of beans ranged
from 33¢ to 46¢ per can. The mean price was
37.5¢ per can. Which was "the price"? Which
"price" did consumers who decided not to buy
cut green beans not pay?
For quantity,  do we measure  consumption
or purchases? Measures of consumption make
more sense  in the  utility  function,  but  mea-
sures of purchases make more sense in the bud-
get constraint.  In a study of monthly demand,
how do we handle items purchased one month
but consumed in later months?  What are the
imputed  prices of vegetables from home gar-
dens? How do we treat gifts?
In theorizing  and  conceptualizing  we  use
ideal  types; we create  our own ideal types.  If
we avoid contradictions and logical errors, we
cannot make false statements about them. They
are whatever we say they are and our conclu-
sions are ideal truth, but may be false in reality.
Logical  argument  provides  only  hypotheses
about real types. The hypotheses may be true
or false in reality. A statement can be true and
false in the same article:  ideally true where  a
conceptual model is developed and operation-
ally false  where  the  model  is  used  to  study
policy  consequences.  Contradictory  state-
ments can be ideally  true if they refer to dif-
ferent ideal types that possess the same name
but different characteristics.
It is impossible to prove anything about the
real world by deduction because it is not pos-
sible to prove deductively that real types have
the properties attributed to ideal types. This is
so  because  it is  impossible  to derive  logical
conclusions on any subject unless one's prem-
ises deal with the subject (Kemeny,  pp. 233-
34;  and  Nagel,  pp.  373-74).  Any  deductive
proof that a real type  possesses  certain prop-
erties  must  start  with  assumptions  that  de-
scribe properties of real types. And how do we
know the assumptions are operationally  true?
If we  prove  them  from  more basic  assump-
tions,  how do  we  know that the  more basic
assumptions are really true? Do we make an-
other deductive argument from still more basic
assumptions? If so, how do we know that the
still more basic assumptions are operationally
true? Either we continue this process forever,
proving  each  set  of assumptions  from  more
basic assumptions,  or we  quit at some point
by  agreeing  to  use  assumptions  that are  not
proven  but are  accepted  on  grounds  of rea-
sonableness, plausibility,  introspection, math-
ematical  convenience,  shared  experience,  or
whatever.  Consequently,  logical  conclusions
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that real  types possess  certain  properties  are
ultimately  derived  from  unproved  assump-
tions.  For example,  the assumptions of com-
pleteness, reflexivity, transitivity, monotonici-
ty,  nonsatiation,  and  convexity of preference
are used to demonstrate  the existence of con-
sumer utility functions,  which are used to de-
rive properties of demand functions. These as-
sumptions have not been deductively derived
from some more fundamental  assumptions.
Because there  is no logical  necessity to be-
lieve the real truth of unproven  assumptions,
there is no logical necessity to believe the real
truth of the conclusions.
True assumptions need not lead to true con-
clusions. If the assumptions individually pre-
sent real truth but collectively present only part
of the truth, the conclusions may be false. And
if  our assumptions present the whole real truth,
we do not have a theory because we have not
abstracted;  we simply  have a small-scale  du-
plication  of all  the  "blooming,  buzzing  con-
fusion of  reality" in all its incomprehensibility.
For a graphic depiction of the fallibility of de-
duction,  see  Hofstadter  (especially  pp.  192-
93). Also see Ladd (1987,  p.  133).
The impossibility of  proving anything about
real  types by deduction  becomes  more easily
acceptable when we realize that we obtain con-
tradictory  conclusions  from  deductive  argu-
ments simply by changing from one set of plau-
sible assumptions to another.
One  implication  of  my  argument  is  that
"impressive"  is  not  synonymous  with  "use-
ful." A mathematically impressive paper may
contribute nothing to our understanding of the
real world.
Induction (Including Econometrics) is Fallible
Induction  and  econometrics  also  are  fallible
guides  to  truth  and  knowledge  and  cannot
demonstrate that real types have the properties
possessed  by ideal  types.3 One reason  is  ex-
pressed in the Duhem-Quine  thesis. This the-
sis is a consequence  of the fact that every hy-
pothesis is derived from several assumptions,
not from one  assumption.  As a result, obser-
vations that contradict a hypothesis tell us that
3 You may believe that we do not test hypotheses  or models for
truth but only for  applicability  or for predictive  power.  For you,
I  revise this  sentence  to read,  "Induction  is a  fallible  guide  to
applicability and to predictive power and cannot demonstrate that
our ideal types are applicable to study of real types nor that our
ideal economic types  correctly predict behavior of real types."
at least  one assumption is  wrong but do  not
identify  the  incorrect  ones.  Every  statistical
test is a test of a joint hypothesis that consists
of all  of the  assumptions  that were  used  in
deriving the test, and a statistically  significant
test  tells  us  probabilistically  that  some  hy-
pothesis  is wrong,  but does not tell us which
one is  wrong. It is  easy to provide examples
of  the Duhem-Quine thesis. Johnston (pp. 214-
21,246-49, and 281-82) shows that heteroske-
dasticity,  autoregressive  errors,  and errors  of
measurement can cause Type I or Type II er-
rors. Theil (pp. 215,326-33) shows how choice
of incorrect functional  form, exclusion of rel-
evant variables, or use of false restrictions lead
to specification  bias and  statistical errors.
A statistically  significant outcome  of a test
of the hypothesis that consumer demand func-
tions are homogeneous  may arise from any or
all of the following:  (a) functions are not ho-
mogeneous;  (b) consumers  were  not in  static
equilibrium;  (c) they did not know all prices;
(d)  their  preferences  changed;  (e)  prices  or
quantities were improperly  measured;  (f)  in-
correct functional forms were used;  (g) wrong
levels of statistical significance  were used; and
(h) incorrect assumptions were made about the
error terms. Hence, if you want to believe the
hypothesis  that consumer  demand  functions
are homogeneous,  you can find all sorts of rea-
sons for refusing to reject that hypothesis even
though statistical tests yield highly significant
outcomes.  As McCloskey  (p.  487)  observes,
"Falsification is not cogent."
But failure to falsify  is not cogent either.  It
is possible that failure to reject a false homo-
geneity  hypothesis  results  from  some  of the
conditions I just listed or from combinations
of the conditions.  For more discussion of Du-
hem-Quine,  see  Caldwell  (pp.  126,  156-57)
and Cross.
A little-recognized characteristic  of hypoth-
esis tests, which is independent of the Duhem-
Quine thesis,  is that rejection is probabilisti-
cally  unambiguous,  whereas  nonrejection  is
ambiguous.  For  any selected  critical  level,  a
large (absolute)  value of the test statistic,  say
bl/sb,, leads unambiguously  to rejection of the
null hypothesis,  fl  = 0; it is inconsistent with
that hypothesis (if we ignore  Duhem-Quine).
By contrast, an (absolutely) small value is con-
sistent with  gi  =  0 but is also consistent with
its contradiction,  d1  #  0.
Suppose we have chosen a 1% critical level,
and the 99%  confidence interval for f1 is .2  <
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￿1  <  .5.  This is inconsistent with fl,  =  0 and
leads to rejection of fl  = 0.  Now suppose  the
99% confidence interval is -. 2 ￿<  /  < .5. This
leads  to nonrejection  of fl  = 0  because it  is
consistent with the null hypothesis. But it also
leads to nonrejection of the contradictory  hy-
pothesis,  /,  = 0,  because  the confidence  in-
terval includes nonzero values.  Thus, the test
statistic that confirms the null hypothesis that
consumer demand functions are homogeneous
also is consistent with the alternative  hypoth-
esis and with all the models in which demand
functions  of rational,  well-informed  consum-
ers are nonhomogeneous.
Because deduction and induction are fallible
guides to truth and understanding and neither
proves  anything about the real world,  I have
a recommendation  to students.  You do need
to remember what we professors say-at least
remember  it until  you  have  passed  our  ex-
aminations.  You do need to remember what
we say; but you don't need to believe what we
say.
Manuscript Review  Process
The distinction  between ideal  and  real types
is  not  merely  epistemological  nit-picking.  It
has practical importance. Many journal manu-
scripts are rejected because the authors do not
understand the distinction between ideal types
and real types, nor the role of each in science.
Two  examples:  (a) A person  ignores genetics
in an economic  study of animal  breeding. As
a consequence,  the economist's ideal types bear
little resemblance to the ideal types that animal
breeders  have found that they need,  and the
economist  studies a world that animal breed-
ers and livestock producers  do not recognize.
(b) An investigator  uses  a complicated  econ-
ometric procedure designed to compensate  for
the lack of certain data even though the data
is available.  The basic error of these authors,
I believe,  arises from the mistaken belief that
anything  that is ideal truth is  also real truth.
Philosophers call this "reification":  confusing
an abstraction  with the real thing.
Sometimes as I review a manuscript,  I find
myself asking, "Is this a poorly written report
of well-done  research or an accurate report of
poorly done  research?"  Obviously,  I  recom-
mend that the paper not be published.
The  manuscript  review  process might best
be  viewed  as  a stochastic  process.  Brorsen's
guide to the publication process provides ways
to reduce the random element in your favor.
You  young people  are  wrong  if you think
that established members of the profession can
get anything  published.  The  rate of rejection
of my papers  is about  the same  as it always
has been. Over the course of my career,  about
two-thirds of the papers  I have  submitted to
journals have been rejected. 4
Heuristic Reasoning
In addition  to  intuition,  deduction,  and  in-
duction, we also use heuristic reasoning. Polya
(p.  112)  has  written,  "Moder  heuristic  en-
deavors to understand  the process  of solving
problems,  especially  the  mental  operations
typically useful in this process."
The  informed,  rational  judgment  of pro-
ductive  scientists  uses  heuristics.  One  set  of
heuristics for problem solving consists of search
methods.  Chapter 2 of Hayes includes an in-
formative presentation  of proximity methods
of searching for problem solutions (hill-climb-
ing,  means-end  analysis,  fractionation,  and
knowledge-based  methods)  and  of  finding
problem  solutions  by.pattern  matching.  The
"recognition"  that Simon  (1989) found to be
so important in scientific discovery often takes
the form of pattern matching,  of recognizing,
e.g., that a current task can be described by the
same logical or mathematical pattern that de-
scribed  a  task that  already  has been  solved.
Cognitive  scientists who  have studied  scien-
tific discovery regularly  write  about heuristic
thinking.  Kulkari  and  Simon  wrote  about
biochemical discovery. But their rules are sug-
gestive of general heuristics useful in any sci-
entific  research.  They present  heuristic  rules
for: choosing problems,  generating  problems,
proposing  experiments,  setting  expectations,
generating hypotheses, modifying hypotheses,
modifying  confidence  levels,  choosing  a  hy-
pothesis,  and  choosing  a  strategy.  The  psy-
chologist Wicker presented four heuristic strat-
egies for generating new insights: "playing with
ideas,  considering  contexts,  probing  and tin-
kering  with  assumptions,  and  clarifying  and
systematizing the conceptual frame" (p. 1094).
4 This may be a typical rejection  rate. One  reviewer expressed
the suspicion that "... nearly all agricultural economists' rejection
rates are running about two-thirds of submissions..  ." [emphasis
in original].
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Devoting time to serious study of the work of
cognitive  scientists  on  problem  solving  will
benefit you at least as much as devoting equal
time to study of economic journals.
When  I  was  teaching  a graduate  course in
linear economic  models and was regularly us-
ing linear programming in my research, I found
the simple treatment of symbolic logic in Ke-
meny,  Snell,  and Thompson  helped  me un-
derstand and  devise proofs in matrix and set
theory.  Studying  Solow's  compact  treatment
of mathematical  thought  processes  can  help
you  understand  and  create  mathematical
proofs.
Theory or Metatheory?
To handle the great diversity and changeability
of the world's real types that we encounter in
studying practical problems, we need a variety
of special  theories  designed  for  specific  con-
ditions.  Consequently, I believe that we could
benefit by spending  less time on received the-
ory  and  more time  on developing  and  com-
paring alternative theories. One reason for my
belief is the disturbing observation that many
young peoples' knowledge-of consumer the-
ory, firm  theory,  welfare  economics,  whatev-
er-is an inch wide and a mile deep. Concern-
ing the textbook consumer theory,  they know
all about reflexivity, transitivity,  nonsatiation,
strict  quasiconcavity,  monotonicity,  homo-
geneity,  Cournot  and  Engel  additivity,  sym-
metry, negative semidefiniteness, every boring
detail, and they cherish every one of them. But
they are not even aware of any other consumer
behavior theory; they are ignorant of the con-
tributions  of Pfouts;  Kalman;  Tintner;  Kal-
man  and  Intriligator;  Pollak;  Fox  and  Van
Moeseke;  and  Becker.  It  is possible  that the
one theory they do know is worse than any of
the theories  they do  not know.  They  cannot
be sure that the one they know is better than
any of the others because they have never com-
pared  their  one  theory  with  other  theories.
What  is  even  worse  than their  ignorance  of
alternatives is their failure to recognize  that it
is legitimate and necessary to have alternatives
and their lack of curiosity about  what an al-
ternative might look like. Their attitude seems
to be,  "Who needs two hypotheses?  I already
have one."
I think that these economists  fail to distin-
guish ideal truth from real truth. And they are
willing to accept the first ideal truth they are
taught as being real truth.  This reflects  exces-
sive  faith  in their  professors.  Have  we  edu-
cated these people by providing them such nar-
row training? Or have we brainwashed them? 5
Another  reason  for  recommending  more
metatheory:  theorists are looking for qualita-
tive answers from qualitative inputs, while we
are  usually  looking  for  quantitative  answers
from quantitative inputs. In one way theorists
have more freedom than we do. They can free-
ly create their ideal types. We are restricted to
study of ideal types that resemble real types in
important ways. But in another way, we have
more freedom.  Theorists  have powerful  mo-
tivation to stick  to situations that are simple
enough  to  be  logically  and  mathematically
tractable. With our computer programs we can
easily handle  situations  that are  beyond  the
capabilities  of their mathematics.
In our  impatience  to  exercise  our  mathe-
matical skills upon our assumptions, we ignore
the fact that the assumptions have human im-
plications. Because we are a social science, we
ought to spend some time considering the hu-
man meaning of our assumptions. Spend a few
minutes wondering,  "What  am I like if I  am
the kind of person  that I assume everyone  to
be?"  Let  us  use  our  textbook-consumer  as-
sumptions. The answer is that you are an un-
attractive  person.  An  egoistic hedonist,  your
utility depends only upon your own consump-
tion. You are completely  indifferent to every-
one else's consumption and welfare.  Your diet
is important to you, but you do not care wheth-
er other people are well-fed or starving. It is a
matter of  complete indifference to you whether
others are homeless and naked during the bliz-
zards of January or are sheltered and clothed.
You have no friends;  anyone who  is so com-
pletely unaffected by anyone else's well-being
cannot be a friend to anyone else, and to have
a  friend you  must  be  a friend.  You  are  also
stupid, rational perhaps,  but stupid certainly.
The only things that affect your utility are things
that you individually can buy in a market. You
individually cannot buy clean rivers or  clean
lakes so, even though fishing or boating or skin
diving  may be  hobbies  of yours,  you do  not
care how dirty the lakes are.  You cannot buy
5  One reviewer reacted to this by pointing out, "It is not possible
to  avoid  constraints  in  one's  graduate  training  .... " but  then
added,  ". .. presumably  all but the most unimaginative  of us  go
through  the experience  of breaking out of the  constraints of our
graduate  training."
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a highway, so you are indifferent between tak-
ing an auto pleasure ride on a crowded freeway
or on that empty highway that is used for TV
commercials for new cars.
Economics has long been called the dismal
science. The myth is that it acquired that title
because  of the dismal predictions  of Malthu-
sian theory:  that population must outstrip re-
sources.  The  correct  reason for labeling  eco-
nomics as the dismal science is the dismal view
we have of human nature.
Do We  Reward Dishonesty?
This section is the outgrowth of a coincidence.
Shortly  after reading  Manderscheid's  "Presi-
dent's  Column-Data  Ethics,"  I  watched  a
public television (WGBH) NO VA program en-
titled, "Do Scientists Cheat?" The answer was,
"Yes." The next day I came across a paper by
Telser in which he assumed (p. 29) ". ..  some-
one is honest only if  honesty, or the appearance
of  honesty, pays more than dishonesty. Hence,
if someone  thinks  he can  gain by dishonesty
with  impunity  then  he  will  be  dishonest."
(Other authors have made this same assump-
tion.)  What are  the implications  of these re-
ports?
One implication  is  that we have  dishonest
people in the profession.  Another  is that  we
need to  reorder  our priorities  to place  more
value on  replication.  When  I  was  a  student,
we were taught that replication was a necessary
part of the scientific process. Now anyone who
tries to replicate is accused of duplication  and
hence of  waste. Our motto seems to be, "Noth-
ing worth  doing well  is worth  doing twice."
Such a situation places a premium on cheating.
If I am an anxious assistant professor, or a full
professor protective  of my reputation,  and  I
have a lovely theory that is not quite consistent
with my empirical results and that would merit
publication if they were consistent, I can "gain
by dishonesty with impunity"  by fudging the
numbers.  I  will  not  be  caught.  Nobody  will
replicate  my study; replication has no profes-
sional payoff. Replication would not prove that
I cheated (even if I did). But it would protect
the profession  against  being led  into  serious
error by my dishonesty,  and it would assure
that I cannot build a favorable reputation upon
lies.
If I were  younger,  it would  make me  un-
happy to think that some scientists with whom
I am compared when I am considered for pro-
motion are dishonest and are developing a na-
tional reputation by cheating.  High status is a
scarce item. If the dishonest acquire it, there
is none left for the honest.
We  need development  of new models and
replication of tests also because there is spatial
variation  and  temporal  change  in  economic
structure. Economic theories need to be tested
under  diverse  social  conditions.  In  their
international  comparison  of macro  models,
Shapiro and Halabuk argued that proper econ-
ometric  model  construction  depends  impor-
tantly upon an economy's resources, industrial
pattern, institutional arrangements,  behavior-
al characteristics,  and objectives of economic
agents.  Replication  is  needed  over  time  to
identify  outdated  theories  because  as  Hicks
(1975)  stated,
Our facts are not permanent, or repeatable,  like the facts
of  the  natural  sciences;  they  change  incessantly  and
change without repetition.... There are theories which
at particular times are fairly appropriate,  but which are
subsequently  rejected,  or  neglected,  not because  they
have been  superseded by a more  powerful  theory but
because  in the course of time they have become inap-
propriate....  (pp. 320-21)
Also,  see  Hutchison  (chapter  11)  on  revolu-
tions in economics.
Anyone  who  values  intuition  and  innova-
tion highly must also value replication highly.
Why? Because our intuitions and innovations
are  affected  by  our  values.  Also,  we  usually
publish  only  plausible  empirical  results  and
plausibility  is  also  a  product  of our  values.
Without replication we see only the results that
fit one author's set of values (Ladd 1983). Rep-
lication allows us to compare innovations and
plausible results under different sets of values.
Replication is also necessary to obtain objec-
tivity. Ackoff argued,
Objectivity  is  not the absence  of value judgments  in
purposeful  behavior....  Objectivity  is  a  systematic
property of science taken as a whole, not a property of
individual researchers or research. It is obtained  only
when all values have been taken into account. It is value-
full, not value free [emphasis in original].  (p.  103)
Without replication, it is impossible to take all
values  into  account,  hence,  impossible  to
achieve objectivity.
Two  Gems  of Wisdom
I  have  two  recommendations  for  you  when
work is not going well; it took me many years
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to formulate  these. (a) Don't just sit there, do
something; (b) don't do anything, just sit there.
On the first: don't just sit, try something; draw
a graph, write  an equation,  rewrite the equa-
tion,  find  an  economic  interpretation  of the
terms in the equation, list and define variables,
list  and  define  parameters,  do  something.  If
you don't do anything, you won't do anything
right.
On the second: don't consciously think about
anything.  Quit trying  so hard,  relax,  let your
mind wonder,  speculate, daydream.  Establish
"the core of silence that provides the best back-
ground for intuition"  (Goldberg,  p.  152).
A third secret of success is to know the rule
that tells when to follow (a) and when to follow
(b). Unfortunately,  I do not know this rule.
[Received February 1990; final revision
received January 1991.]
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